Errare humanum est

A few days later, a third firefighter died of his injuries. There were also 7 serious injuries and 22 minor injuries. I would like to start by expressing my condolences to the families and colleagues involved. As a member of the Safety Committee of the EFNMS - the European maintenance federation - I cannot refrain from dwelling a little longer on what happened. Because, unfortunately, renewed maintenance is at the root of an industrial accident. 

Explosion

A few days before the accident, a specialised company had started maintenance work on an ethylene pipeline. The purpose of this work was the preventive replacement of various parts of the pipeline. The pipeline had been taken out of service and secured for this purpose. However, on 17/10 at around 11.30 a.m., a fire started near the works. Members of the BASF fire brigade, emergency services and environmental protection arrived on site a few minutes later and immediately started preparing for the intervention. However, at the start of the extinguishing work, a violent explosion suddenly occurred, with the previously mentioned disastrous consequences.
As a result, several fires broke out and additional resources and men were deployed to extinguish and cool the fire.  As the directives prescribe in such situations, we opted for further controlled combustion of the leaking gases and products. At 21:30, all fires were fully extinguished. 

What went wrong?

The accident is currently still under investigation by the Frankenthal Public Prosecutor's Office and the scene is still sealed by the authorities at the time of writing.  The information available is therefore limited and premature. However, the first facts are known that may shed some light on what went wrong.  

According to a statement by the prosecutor, during a site investigation immediately after the accident, an incision from an angle grinder was found in a pipeline near the one that had been taken out of service for maintenance. This pipeline had not been secured and contained a flammable butylene mixture. Therefore, there are strong suspicions that the first fire was caused by grinding in the wrong pipe.

What can we learn from this?

The press release issued by BASF in response to the accident stresses that safety is the first priority, both for the Ludwigshafen site and for the other BASF sites around the world. Safety, health and environmental protection are important components of the company's values and goals. Anyone doing business with BASF can be sure that these are not empty words. Both own employees and contractors are trained and tested in safety. Maintenance work invariably includes a permit. Contractors are clearly briefed on the nature and location of the work and the risks involved. Yet something went wrong here. How the mistake could have been avoided we will certainly find out after the investigation is completed. But no doubt everyone has heard a story before about maintenance being carried out on the wrong installation.  That is why I am pleading for us to think hard together about how such mix-ups can be better avoided. 

Conclusion

The accident at BASF shows that, despite all the attention paid to safety, a small mistake during maintenance work can have fatal consequences. Errare humanum est, to err is human.  Any idea to avoid this is welcome! 

Wim Vancauwenberghe
Director BEMAS
react to @MaintEvangelist or on the BEMAS Linkedin Group